

Reconstruction of the Presidential System through the Fifth Amendment to the 1945 Constitution: The Legitimacy of the Vice President and the Balance of Power

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Abstract This article examines the discourse surrounding the fifth amendment to the 1945 Constitution, which has resurfaced in Indonesia's constitutional discourse during the 2024–2025 period. The study includes an analysis of the main points of the proposed amendments put forward by various parties, with a primary focus on three issues: first, the restructuring of the presidential and vice-presidential nomination system, in which the president continues to be directly elected by the people, but the vice president is nominated by the elected president for approval by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR); second, strengthening the authority of the Judicial Commission (KY) and the Regional Representatives Council (DPD); and third, restructuring the judicial system. This article also examines the response of House of Representatives (DPR) Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, who opened the possibility for the MPR to discuss the amendments, and analyzes the pros and cons of each proposal from a constitutional law perspective. The study is supplemented by a comparative analysis of presidential systems in various countries, an analysis of the risks involved in the amendment process, and recommendations regarding the principles that should guide the fifth amendment should it actually be implemented.

Keywords: fifth amendment to the 1945 Constitution; presidential system; vice president; People's Consultative Assembly (MPR); Judicial Commission; Regional Representatives Council (DPD); Sufmi Dasco Ahmad; constitutional law.

1. Introduction

The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD 1945) has undergone four amendments since the reform era began in 1999–2002. These four amendments fundamentally transformed Indonesia's constitutional architecture: from a quasi-monarchical state dominated by the President and the MPR to a presidential system with far stronger checks and balances, comprehensive guarantees of human rights, and new institutions such as the Constitutional Court, the Judicial Commission, and the Regional Representatives Council (DPD).

However, more than two decades after the completion of the four amendments, various unresolved institutional and constitutional issues continue to surface. The highly asymmetrical bicameral system—in which the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) has very limited authority—has drawn criticism for its suboptimal representation of the regions. The Judicial Commission's authority is viewed as too weak to ensure the integrity and independence of the judiciary. And most controversially, there is discussion regarding the mechanism for nominating the Vice President, which has the potential to alter how the President and Vice President are elected.

It is in this context that discussions regarding the fifth amendment to the 1945 Constitution have gained renewed momentum for the 2024–2025 period. A number of figures have proposed restructuring the national leadership system, whereby the president would continue to be elected directly by the people, while the vice president would be nominated by the elected president for approval by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR) Sufmi Dasco

Ahmad has also opened the door for the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to discuss amending the 1945 Constitution. The resurgence of this discourse cannot be separated from the surrounding political context: the new Prabowo–Gibran administration, the KIM Plus supermajority coalition in the DPR, and the various interests of different groups in restructuring the architecture of power.

This article aims to: first, examine the history and constitutional basis of the process of amending the 1945 Constitution; second, comprehensively analyze the key points of the proposed fifth amendment; third, to specifically examine the discourse on the mechanism for nominating the Vice President through the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR); fourth, to analyze Sufmi Dasco Ahmad's response and its implications; fifth, to conduct a comparative analysis with presidential systems in other countries; and sixth, to identify risks and formulate principles that should guide the amendment if it is implemented.

2. History and Mechanism of Amendments to the 1945 Constitution

A. Four Amendments: A Summary

The four amendments to the 1945 Constitution carried out between 1999 and 2002 constituted the largest constitutional reform in Indonesia's history since independence. Each amendment brought about fundamental changes to the system of government:

Amendment	Year	Main Substance	Constitutional Impact
First Amendment	1999	Limits the President's powers; strengthens the authority of the House of Representatives; limits the President's term to two terms	The power to enact laws was transferred from the President to the House of Representatives
Second Amendment	2000	Strengthened regional autonomy; added a chapter on human rights (Chapter XA); removed the DPR from the MPR	Provisions on the territory of the state; local government
Third Amendment	2001	Establishment of the Constitutional Court; establishment of the Regional Representatives Council; provisions for direct presidential elections; establishment of the Judicial Commission; strengthening of the Supreme Audit Agency	Most fundamental: establishing a new constitutional architecture
Fourth Amendment	2002	Abolition of the TUU Constitution; the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) no longer has the authority to formulate the State Development Guidelines (GBHN); the MPR is no longer the highest institution	Ending the MPR's dominance; the President is not subject to the GBHN
Amendment V (proposed)	2024–2025+	Reorganization of the presidential system (vice presidential candidate); strengthening of the KY and DPD; reorganization of judicial power	No certainty yet; currently under discussion and in the early stages of deliberation

The third amendment (2001) was the most fundamental because it established a number of new institutions and drastically altered the distribution of state power. The establishment of the Constitutional

Court (MK), direct presidential elections, the formation of the Regional Representatives Council (DPD), and the creation of the Judicial Commission (KY) were all products of the third amendment, which to this day remain the main pillars of Indonesia's constitutional architecture.

B. Constitutional Mechanisms for Amending the 1945 Constitution

Article 37 of the 1945 Constitution governs the mechanism for amending the Constitution. This provision sets forth fairly strict requirements to ensure that constitutional changes are not made arbitrarily:

Proposers	A proposal for amendment may be submitted by at least one-third of the total members of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) (equivalent to 237 out of 711 members).
MPR Session	The MPR convenes to discuss the proposed amendment; a quorum of at least two-thirds of all members (474 out of 711) is required.
Decision	Each proposed amendment to an article is decided by a vote of at least 50% + 1 of all MPR members (356 out of 711 members).
Restrictions	Specifically, no amendments may be made to the form of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Article 37, paragraph (5)).
Procedures	The procedures for amendments are further regulated in the MPR's rules of procedure.

The requirement of a two-thirds quorum for a session and the approval of a majority of all MPR members places amendments to the 1945 Constitution in a category that is procedurally very difficult. However, with the dominance of KIM Plus, which controls more than 80% of the seats in the DPR, and given that DPR members are part of the MPR, these procedural requirements are no longer a significant political obstacle.

C. Political Context: Why Has This Debate Resurfaced?

The discourse on the fifth amendment did not emerge in a vacuum. It arose from a combination of several interacting factors:

- **Dissatisfaction with the existing constitutional architecture:** For more than two decades, various constitutional weaknesses have been identified and documented—ranging from the bicameral asymmetry between the DPD and the DPR to the limitations on the authority of the KY.
- **Post-2024 Presidential Election Political Dynamics:** The 2024 presidential election highlighted just how controversial the issue of vice-presidential nominations is. The Constitutional Court's controversial Decision No. 90/PUU-XXI/2023 has sparked a broader discussion on whether the system of nominating the President and Vice President as a single package is the optimal model.
- **The political clout of KIM Plus:** A supermajority coalition in the DPR—which also translates to a supermajority in the MPR—creates a political environment that, mathematically speaking, allows for amendments to be passed without encountering significant procedural obstacles.
- **Statements by Key Figures:** The statement by House of Representatives Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, which opened the door for the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to discuss the amendment, sends an important political signal that this discussion is not merely an academic discourse but a real possibility on the political agenda.

3. Key Points of the Fifth Amendment Proposal

A. A Comprehensive Overview of the Amendment Agenda

The discourse on the fifth amendment covers a number of interrelated issues that can be distinguished in terms of their respective urgency and complexity:

Proposed Key Points	Substance	Potential Impact	Urgency
Nomination of the Vice President	The President is elected directly; the Vice President is nominated by the President-elect for approval by the MPR	Eliminates paired candidates; strengthens the President's authority in selecting a running mate	Very high
Strengthening the Authority of the DPD	Expanding the DPD's authority to be equal to or close to that of the DPR in certain areas	Addressing extreme bicameral asymmetry; strengthening regional representation	High
Strengthening the Authority of the Judicial Commission	Expanding the Judicial Commission's authority in the selection and oversight of judges	Strengthening judicial independence; preventing judicial nepotism and corruption	High
Reorganization of Judicial Power	Reforming the relationship between the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, and the Judicial Commission; clearer integration or delineation of authority	Addressing jurisdictional overlap; strengthening the consistency of case law	Medium-High
Status of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)	Redefining the role of the MPR in the presidential system: should it return to being the highest institution, or remain as it is now?	This is a fundamental issue; it affects the entire architecture of power	Controversial
Presidential Election System	Should it remain a direct presidential election or be modified; related to the nomination of vice-presidential candidates through the MPR	Has a direct impact on the President's legitimacy and accountability	Very high

B. The Issue of Vice Presidential Nomination: The Most Controversial Proposal

Among the various key points of the fifth amendment proposal, the change to the vice presidential nomination mechanism is the most controversial and has the most fundamental implications. This proposal can be summarized as follows:

Proposed New Mechanism for Vice Presidential Nomination

Current System	The President and Vice President are nominated as a single ticket (pair); both are directly elected by the people in a single presidential election
New Proposal	The President is elected directly by the people (without a running mate); after being elected, the President nominates a candidate for Vice President to the MPR
MPR Mechanism	The MPR approves or rejects the Vice Presidential nominee proposed by the President-elect
Rationale	To strengthen the President's authority in selecting his or her working partner; to avoid conflicts between the President and Vice President due to differing agendas
Comparative Precedents	Similar to the U.S. system, where the Vice President is appointed by the President-elect (in the event of a vacancy) subject to congressional approval
Key Risks	Weaker democratic legitimacy of the Vice President; politicization of the MPR in the approval process; potential for increased presidential dominance

C. Analysis of the Pros and Cons of the Proposal to Nominate a Vice Presidential Candidate through the MPR

The proposed change to the Vice Presidential nomination mechanism has sparked strong arguments from both sides:

Arguments in Favor	Arguments Against
Strengthens the President's authority to select a partner who is truly in sync, avoiding conflicts between a President and Vice President with differing agendas	Reduces the Vice President's democratic legitimacy: A Vice President not directly elected by the people has a weaker mandate
Avoids the politicization of the Vice Presidential nomination as a "coalition bargaining chip"; the Vice President is no longer the result of a coalition seat-sharing arrangement	Risk of politicizing the MPR: The MPR approval process will become a venue for intense political negotiations that could potentially be transactional
Allows the President to select the Vice President based on capacity and competence, rather than purely electoral calculations	Potentially reinforces the President's dominance to an excessive degree; a Vice President who is entirely dependent on the President cannot serve as an effective check
Gives the MPR a more active role as the representative of all elements of the state (DPR + DPD)	Contradicts the spirit of direct democracy reinforced by Amendment III (2001); represents a step backward from the achievements of the reform era

Aligns with several presidential models in other countries where the election of the Vice President is not identical to the presidential election mechanism	Creates asymmetry: a President with a direct mandate from the people versus a Vice President who does not; raises questions about succession
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4. Strengthening the Judicial Commission (KY) and the Regional Representatives Council (DPD): The Institutional Reform Agenda

A. Strengthening the Judicial Commission: Why Is an Amendment Necessary?

The Judicial Commission (KY) was established through the third amendment to the 1945 Constitution with a mandate to uphold the honor, dignity, and conduct of judges. However, in practice, the KY's authority is very limited—it can propose the appointment of Supreme Court justices and uphold the honor of judges, but it lacks full authority to determine the selection of judges or impose final sanctions.

These limitations have led to several problems: weak oversight of judicial conduct, inconsistent standards of integrity in the selection of judges, and the KY's suboptimal role as the guardian of judicial independence. Some parties have proposed that the fifth amendment strengthen the KY's authority, including potentially granting it greater authority in the selection of Supreme Court justices and Constitutional Court justices, as well as in enforcing the judicial code of ethics.

Aspect	Current Powers of the KY (Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution)	Proposed Strengthening in Amendment V
Appointment of Supreme Court Justices	Proposing the appointment of Supreme Court Justices to the House of Representatives	Playing a full role in the selection process; not merely proposing candidates
Supervision of judges	Upholding the dignity and conduct of judges	Stronger investigative powers; more binding recommendations
Sanctions against judges	Limited to recommendations to the Supreme Court	Authority to impose certain sanctions directly
Scope of oversight	Supreme Court justices and other judges	Extended to Constitutional Court justices (an issue still under debate)
Institutional	Independent but with limited authority	Constitutionally and operationally strengthened

B. Strengthening the DPD: Addressing Bicameral Asymmetry

The issue of structural asymmetry between the DPR and the DPD has been one of the most consistent criticisms of Indonesia's post-reform constitutional architecture. The DPD, which only has the authority to propose and debate certain bills, without a binding vote in final decision-making, makes it a very weak second chamber in the international comparative spectrum.

Discussions on strengthening the DPD in the fifth amendment include several possibilities:

- Granting a limited veto right over bills directly related to regional interests (adopting the German Bundesrat model);
- Participation in the approval of the state budget, particularly the portion allocated to the regions;

- An active role in the appointment of certain public officials who have a direct impact on the regions;
- The ability to independently initiate bills to the House of Representatives (DPR) and/or the President.

Strengthening the DPD through the fifth amendment will directly reinforce the representation of regional interests within the national constitutional system, while simultaneously moving Indonesia toward a more balanced bicameral model. This must be done carefully to avoid creating institutional deadlocks in the legislative process.

C. Restructuring the Judicial System

Reforming the judicial system is the third key proposal, encompassing interrelated issues: how the relationship between the Supreme Court (MA) and the Constitutional Court (MK) should be structured, how the Judicial Commission (KY) should be positioned in relation to both, and how to ensure that the Indonesian judiciary is truly independent from interference by other branches of government.

Some specific issues proposed in this context include: whether there should be a formal coordination mechanism between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court to prevent conflicts in jurisprudence; whether the Judicial Commission should have oversight authority over Constitutional Court justices (an issue that has long been highly controversial); and how the recruitment mechanisms for Supreme Court justices and Constitutional Court justices can be improved to produce more competent and ethical judges.

5. Sufmi Dasco Ahmad's Response and the Political Dynamics of the Amendment

A. Sufmi Dasco Ahmad's Statement: Opening the Door to Amendments

"The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) has the authority to discuss amendments to the 1945 Constitution. If there are calls from various parties to pursue amendments, the MPR is certainly open to discussing them. What is important is that the process is conducted constitutionally, transparently, and with public participation." (Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives).

The statement by House of Representatives Deputy Speaker Sufmi Dasco Ahmad, which opens the possibility for the MPR to discuss amendments, is a very important political signal. Sufmi Dasco is not just an ordinary politician—he is one of the key figures in the Gerindra Party, led by President Prabowo Subianto. His statement indicates that at least a segment of the inner circle of power is seriously opening up space for a discourse on constitutional amendments.

B. Constitutional Implications of the Statement

There are at least three dimensions of implications from Sufmi Dasco's statement that need to be examined:

1. Procedural dimension: The statement opening the possibility for the MPR to discuss amendments does not mean that amendments will definitely take place. The amendment process must still follow the procedures set forth in Article 37 of the 1945 Constitution, which requires a proposal from one-third of MPR members and the approval of a majority of all members.
2. Political dimension: In the context of the KIM Plus coalition, which dominates the House of Representatives (DPR) and, consequently, the MPR, this statement can be interpreted as an

indication that the ruling coalition is considering leveraging the current political momentum to pursue constitutional reform.

3. Substantive dimension: Sufmi Dasco's statement emphasizes that the process must be transparent and involve public participation. This is important because one of the main concerns in the amendment discourse is that a process that is too rushed and closed off could result in a constitution that reflects the interests of the elite rather than the will of the people.

C. The Supermajority Context: Opportunities and Dangers

The dominance of KIM Plus in the House of Representatives (DPR) and, implicitly, in the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) presents a unique dilemma in the context of constitutional amendment. On the one hand, a supermajority procedurally allows amendments to be carried out without obstacles. On the other hand, amendments carried out without sufficiently broad and inclusive deliberation have the potential to result in a constitution that lacks the necessary legitimacy from the entire spectrum of society.

The experience of the 1999–2002 amendments demonstrates that a sound process requires time, deliberation, and the involvement of various societal groups. Amendments carried out too hastily—driven solely by the political calculations of the ruling coalition—risk producing a constitutional text that will later be challenged by future generations.

Constitutional amendments carried out under the dominance of a single coalition without significant opposition carry serious risks: the results may reflect the interests of the ruling coalition rather than the long-term interests of the nation and its people. The principle that the constitution is an agreement of the entire nation—not merely a consensus among the ruling parties—must serve as the primary guide in every amendment process.

6. Comparative Analysis: The Presidential System and the Vice Presidential Mechanism

A. Variations in Global Presidential Systems

Presidential systems in various countries exhibit a wide range of variations in terms of election mechanisms and the role of the Vice President. This comparison is important for assessing whether Indonesia's proposal is a proven innovation or a step backward from democratic standards:

Country	Presidential Election Mechanisms	Role of the Vice President	Notes
United States	Direct presidential election (Electoral College); Vice President on the same ticket	Vice President is fully aligned with the President; minimal checks outside of the presidential election	Stable; the Vice President is highly loyal but has freedom of action within the constitution
France (Semi-Presidential)	Direct presidential election; Prime Minister appointed from the majority party in parliament	Prime Minister acts as a bridge between the President and Parliament; no Vice President	Cohabitation may occur if the President's party does not hold a majority

Mexico	Direct presidential election; Vice President is part of the same ticket	Vice President's role is very limited; determines succession	Tends to be monolithic; reforms are underway
Brazil	Direct presidential election; Vice President on the same ticket	Vice President from a coalition; sometimes from a different party than the President	Broad coalition but potential for internal conflict between the President and Vice President
Indonesia today	Direct presidential election; Vice President on the same ticket	Vice President from the coalition; must be a single pair on the ticket	A single ticket; the 2024 presidential election shows high dynamics among vice presidential candidates
Indonesia (proposed amendment)	Direct presidential election; Vice President nominated by the President to the MPR	Vice President chosen by the President-elect; the MPR grants approval	The President has greater freedom to choose the Vice President; the MPR plays a larger role

B. Lessons from Comparative Experience

Several important lessons can be drawn from the comparative analysis above:

1. There is no single ideal model: Presidential systems in various countries vary greatly in terms of the mechanisms for electing the Vice President. More important than the mechanism itself is whether it results in stability, accountability, and an effective government.
2. Vice Presidents elected alongside the President tend to be more stable: A "ticket system," such as the one currently in place in Indonesia and the United States, tends to produce a more stable President-Vice President relationship because both hold the same electoral mandate. Systems that separate the elections for President and Vice President have the potential to create conflicts of interest if the two have different electoral bases.
3. Parliamentary approval of the Vice President opens the door to negotiation: In countries where the Vice President or head of government requires parliamentary approval, this approval process often becomes an arena for intense political negotiation. This can be interpreted positively (as checks and balances) or negatively (as politicization and power deals).
4. Democratic legitimacy remains crucial: In the era of contemporary democracy, legitimacy derived from direct popular election carries immense moral and political weight. A vice president who is not directly elected must face questions about their legitimacy, especially if they are called upon to assume presidential functions.

7. Risk Analysis and Recommendations

A. Risk Matrix for the Amendment Process

The process of amending the 1945 Constitution for the fifth time, if actually carried out, carries a number of risks that need to be seriously identified and mitigated:

Risk	Description	Level	Mitigation
Instability of the amendment process	The MPR is dominated by KIM Plus; risk of amendments being made too quickly without adequate deliberation	High	Requires strong public participation mechanisms
Excessive strengthening of the executive branch	The proposal to nominate a vice presidential candidate through the MPR has the potential to reinforce the President's dominance	Medium-High	An equivalent counterbalance is needed
Politicization of the MPR in the approval of the Vice President	An MPR controlled by the coalition could use the vice presidential approval process as a political tool	High	Clear and transparent procedures are needed
Weakening of the Vice President's legitimacy	A Vice President who is not directly elected by the people may lack legitimacy	Moderate	Needs to be examined from the perspective of representative democracy
Failure of the partial amendment	An amendment that addresses only the vice presidential candidate without systemic reform could result in constitutional inconsistencies	High	Must be carried out comprehensively
Opens the door to democratic regression	Amendments could be misused to advance other, unannounced agendas	Moderate	A clear and transparent agenda is needed from the outset

B. Prerequisites for the Legitimacy of the Amendment

Based on the experience of previous amendments and comparative constitutional studies, there are several prerequisites for legitimacy that must be met if the fifth amendment is to be implemented:

1. A clear mandate from the people: Constitutional amendments should be based on a clear mandate from the people—either through a special referendum (if desired) or through a broad and meaningful public consultation process, not merely an administrative formality.
2. Sufficient and inclusive deliberation: The process of discussing the amendment must not be rushed. Sufficient time is needed for academic discussion, consultation with constitutional experts, dialogue with community groups in various regions, and open public debate.
3. Full transparency: The entire amendment deliberation process—including the drafts under discussion, meeting minutes, and arguments presented by all parties—must be accessible to the public in real time.
4. Multi-stakeholder inclusivity: The amendment process must involve not only the political parties in the House of Representatives (DPR), but also constitutional law scholars, civil society, women's and minority groups, as well as representatives from regions that have historically been underrepresented.

5. Comprehensiveness: Amendments that address only one or two issues—such as the mechanism for nominating the Vice President—without considering their systemic implications for the overall constitutional architecture risk creating new constitutional inconsistencies.

C. Substantive Recommendations for the Amendment

If the fifth amendment is to proceed, this article recommends several substantive principles to guide it:

- Regarding the nomination of the Vice President: If the proposal to have the Vice President nominated by the MPR is retained, there must be a mechanism ensuring that (i) the President has genuine freedom in selecting the Vice President without pressure from the coalition; (ii) the MPR's approval process is based on an assessment of the candidate's competence and integrity, not political calculations; and (iii) there are clear procedures to address situations where the President is unable to nominate a candidate who can be approved by the MPR.
- Regarding the strengthening of the DPD: The strengthening of the DPD must be carried out in a measured manner to avoid legislative deadlock. The German Bundesrat model—in which the DPD holds an absolute veto only over bills that directly affect regional interests—is the most proportionate and proven option.
- Regarding the strengthening of the KY: The expansion of the KY's authority must be accompanied by a strengthening of institutional capacity and adequate internal accountability mechanisms. A more powerful KY that lacks accountability could create new problems.
- Regarding the structure of judicial power: The relationship between the Supreme Court (MA), the Constitutional Court (MK), and the Judicial Commission (KY) needs to be more explicitly defined in the Constitution to avoid jurisdictional conflicts, which have occurred repeatedly. A formal, constitutional coordination mechanism should be considered.

8. Conclusion

Based on the analysis conducted, this article draws the following conclusions:

1. The discourse on the fifth amendment to the 1945 Constitution is a legitimate expression of the need to address constitutional weaknesses that have been identified since the completion of the first four amendments in 2002. The issue of bicameral asymmetry between the DPD and the DPR, the limitations on the KY's authority, and the potential for conflict between the President and Vice President are real issues that warrant consideration in the context of an amendment.
2. The most controversial proposal—that the President-elect nominate a Vice President for approval by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)—contains legitimate arguments from the perspective of governmental effectiveness, but also poses serious risks to the democratic legitimacy of the Vice President, the potential for politicization of the MPR, and the possibility of reinforcing excessive presidential dominance. A very careful and comprehensive review is necessary before this proposal is adopted.
3. Sufmi Dasco Ahmad's response, which opens the door for the MPR to discuss amendments, is an important political signal. However, this signal must be interpreted within a broader context: the dominance of KIM Plus in the MPR makes amendments procedurally very likely, but simultaneously poses the risk that amendments will be rushed through without adequate deliberation.
4. A comparative analysis of presidential systems in various countries shows that there is no single ideal model. What matters most is that whatever mechanism is chosen must ensure stability,

accountability, and the effectiveness of governance, as well as possess sufficient democratic legitimacy.

5. If the fifth amendment is implemented, it must meet at least five prerequisites for legitimacy: a clear mandate from the people, sufficient and inclusive deliberation, full transparency, multi-stakeholder inclusivity, and a comprehensive—not partial—approach. A constitutional amendment is the most important decision a nation can make for itself; it must be undertaken with full awareness of its consequences for future generations.

Ultimately, a good constitutional amendment is not just about what is changed, but about how the process of change unfolds. A constitution born of an inclusive, deliberative, and transparent process will have far stronger legitimacy and be more resilient to the test of time than a constitution born of short-term political calculations, no matter how technically perfect it may appear. Indonesia in 2025 stands at a crossroads: it can use the existing political momentum to carry out the constitutional reforms that the people truly need and desire, or it can use it to enshrine the interests of certain groups in the text that is the most difficult to change—the constitution.

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