

The Effectiveness of the DPR's Constitutional Rights in Overseeing the Executive Amid the Dominance of the Governing Coalition

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Abstract: This article examines three constitutional rights of the People's Representative Council (DPR) as stipulated in Article 20A(2) of the 1945 Constitution and operationalized through Law No. 17 of 2014 on the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the People's Representative Council (DPR), the Regional Representative Council (DPD), and Regional People's Representative Councils (DPRD) (MD3 Law): the right to conduct an inquiry, the right to interpellation, and the right to express an opinion. These three rights constitute the most powerful instruments of constitutional oversight held by the DPR in carrying out its checks and balances function against the executive branch. This study covers the constitutional and normative foundations, the step-by-step mechanisms for exercising each right, quorum requirements, the relationship between these three rights and the process of impeaching the President or Vice President, an analysis of historical practices in Indonesia (including the 2009–2010 Bank Century inquiry and the 2017 KPK inquiry), as well as a comparative analysis with similar instruments in the parliaments of other countries. This article argues that the effectiveness of these three constitutional rights depends heavily on the dynamics of political coalitions in the DPR and that the prolonged dominance of the governing coalition poses the greatest threat to their function as an effective oversight mechanism.

Keywords: right of inquiry; right of interpellation; right to express an opinion; DPR; MD3 Law; checks and balances; impeachment; constitutional law.

I. Introduction

Among the various powers granted by the Constitution to the People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia, three special rights—known as the DPR's constitutional rights—stand out as the most powerful instruments for exercising its oversight function. These three rights—the right of inquiry, the right of interpellation, and the right to express an opinion—are concrete manifestations of the principle of checks and balances in Indonesia's presidential system: constitutional mechanisms that enable the legislative branch to oversee, question, and even intervene in the actions of the executive branch within the limits set by the Constitution.

Article 20A, paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution states: "In carrying out its functions, in addition to the rights stipulated in other articles of this Constitution, the DPR has the right of interpellation, the right of inquiry, and the right to express an opinion." This single paragraph codifies three rights that, historically, are the product of the legislative branch's long struggle to secure effective tools for controlling the executive branch.

However, there is a striking disparity between the constitutional potential of these three rights and their actual effectiveness in Indonesia's political practice. The Bank Century inquiry (2009–2010) demonstrated that an inquiry process can conclude without any tangible consequences for the government. The KPK inquiry (2017) raised serious constitutional questions regarding whether the House of Representatives (DPR) can conduct an inquiry into an independent institution that is not part of the executive branch. Furthermore, the right to express an opinion—which constitutionally carries the greatest implications, particularly regarding alleged legal violations by the President—has never been exercised to the point of filing a petition with the Constitutional Court (MK) throughout the reform era.

This article aims to: first, examine the constitutional and normative foundations of these three rights; second, comprehensively analyze the mechanisms for exercising each right; third, to examine the quorum requirements and decision-making procedures; fourth, to analyze the relationship between these three rights and the impeachment process; fifth, to examine historical practices; and sixth, to conduct a comparative analysis with similar instruments in the parliaments of other countries.

II. Constitutional and Normative Foundations

A. Constitutional Basis: Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution

The three constitutional rights of the DPR derive from Article 20A of the 1945 Constitution—an article added through the first amendment (1999) and one of the most significant contributions of the constitutional reform process toward strengthening the legislative function. Prior to the amendment, the original 1945 Constitution did not explicitly provide for these three rights, although the DPR's authority to oversee the government already existed implicitly.

Article 20A, paragraph (1)	The DPR has legislative, budgetary, and oversight functions. These three functions form the foundation of all DPR activities, including the exercise of its constitutional rights.
Article 20A, paragraph (2)	The DPR has the right of interpellation, the right of inquiry, and the right to express an opinion. This is the article that explicitly recognizes these three rights at the constitutional level.
Article 20A, paragraph (3)	Every member of the House of Representatives has the right to ask questions, submit proposals and express opinions, as well as the right to immunity. These are the individual rights of members, distinct from the three institutional rights.
Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution	The President and/or Vice President may be removed from office during their term by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) upon the proposal of the House of Representatives (DPR), if it is proven that they have committed a legal violation in the form of treason against the state, corruption, bribery, other serious criminal offenses, or disgraceful conduct.
Article 7B of the 1945 Constitution	This article sets forth the detailed mechanism for impeachment, including the roles of the DPR, the Constitutional Court (MK), and the MPR in the process. This provision links the right to freedom of expression with impeachment.

B. Operationalization through Law No. 17 of 2014

The technical and operational regulations governing the three constitutional rights of the DPR are further elaborated in Law No. 17 of 2014 on the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (MD3 Law), which details the procedures, requirements, and protocols for exercising each of these rights. The MD3 Law serves as the legal framework that bridges the gap between constitutional guarantees of a principled nature and the need for technical and operational procedures. These three rights are regulated in separate articles of the MD3 Law: the right of interpellation (Articles 191–198), the right of inquiry (Articles 199–217), and the right to express an opinion (Articles 218–227). Each section sets forth the requirements for filing, the mechanisms for deliberation, the procedures for implementation, and the follow-up actions regarding the exercise of the relevant right.

III. COMPREHENSIVE COMPARISON OF THE THREE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE DPR

A. Comparison Matrix of the Three Rights

To understand these three rights systematically, the following comparative matrix covers all relevant dimensions, ranging from definitions to constitutional implications:

Aspect	RIGHT OF INQUIRY	RIGHT OF INTERPELLATION	RIGHT TO EXPRESS OPINION
Definition	The right of the House of Representatives to conduct an investigation into the implementation of laws or government policies suspected of violating laws and regulations	The right of the House of Representatives to request information from the President or the government regarding policies that are important, strategic, and have a broad impact on the life of society, the nation, and the state	The DPR's right to express an opinion on government policies or extraordinary events, including alleged violations of the law by the President and/or Vice President
Legal Basis	Article 20A, paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution; Articles 199–217 of Law No. 17 of 2014 on the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the State Council	Article 20A, paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution; Articles 191–198 of Law No. 17 of 2014 on the MD3	Article 20A, paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution; Articles 218–227 of Law No. 17 of 2014 on the MD3
Submission Requirements	Proposed by at least 25 members of the DPR from more than one faction; approved in a plenary session with the support of at least 50% of members and more than one faction	Proposed by at least 25 members of the DPR from more than one faction; approved by a plenary session	Proposed by at least 25 members of the DPR from more than one faction; approved in a plenary session of the DPR
Implementation Mechanism	The DPR forms an inquiry committee; the committee has the authority to summon officials, request documents, and conduct investigations	The President is required to provide a statement; the plenary session discusses and reaches a conclusion	The DPR issues an official statement of opinion; this may lead to recommendations or constitutional follow-up actions
Implications	May result in recommendations to the President, or serve as the basis for the DPR to take further action	May result in policy changes or a statement of opinion by the DPR	If related to alleged legal violations by the President or Vice President, it may serve as the basis for a petition to the Constitutional Court
Characteristics	The strongest in political and legal terms; a formal investigation with coercive authority	Informative and deliberative in nature; a formal forum for dialogue between the House of Representatives and the executive branch	Represents the highest expression of the DPR's views; can carry significant constitutional weight

B. Quorum Requirements and Decision-Making

One of the most crucial aspects of exercising these three powers is the quorum requirements and decision-making mechanisms. These requirements are designed to ensure that the exercise of these very powerful powers has adequate support from the DPR as an institution, not just from a handful of members:

Right	Submission Requirements	Requirements for Plenary Approval	Decision	Notes
Inquiry Rights	At least 25 members of the House of Representatives from more than one faction	At least 50% of DPR members + more than one faction	Majority vote	Strictest: requires a plenary majority
Right to Interpellation	At least 25 members of the House of Representatives from more than one faction	Majority vote in the plenary session	Majority vote	It's simpler; just a majority vote
Right to Express an Opinion	At least 25 members of the House of Representatives from more than one faction	Majority vote in a plenary session	Majority vote	Note: If related to the President or Vice President, there is a special procedure involving the Constitutional Court

The table above shows that the right to initiate an inquiry has the strictest approval requirements—it requires the support of at least 50% of all DPR members in a plenary session, not merely a majority of the members present. This is an important safeguard that prevents the reckless use of the right to initiate an inquiry by a minority that happens to be present at the session.

IV. THE RIGHT OF INQUIRY: THE DPR'S INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY

A. The Nature and Significance of the Right of Inquiry

The right of inquiry is the most powerful right held by the DPR in its capacity as an institution overseeing the executive branch. With this right, the DPR temporarily transforms—within a specific context—from a legislative body into a sort of investigative body that can summon officials, request documents, and conduct examinations regarding the implementation of laws or government policies. The phrase “to conduct an investigation” in the definition of the right of inquiry carries a very important meaning: the DPR does not merely ask questions or request information (as in an interpellation), but actively conducts an investigation. The inquiry committee formed by the DPR has powers that resemble, though are not identical to, investigative powers under procedural law: summoning witnesses, requesting documents, and even engaging experts for technical analysis.

B. Stages of Exercising the Right of Inquiry

The exercise of the right of inquiry follows a structured process that is strictly regulated under the MD3 Law:

No	Stage	Substance	Notes
1	Submission of a Proposal	At least 25 members of the House of Representatives from more than one faction submit a written proposal for an inquiry to the leadership of the House of Representatives, accompanied by the rationale, the subject matter to be investigated, and the signatures of the proposers	The multi-faction requirement prevents the dominance of a single faction

2	Discussion in a Plenary Session	The DPR holds a plenary session to discuss and decide whether to approve the motion for a parliamentary inquiry; approval requires at least 50% of members from more than one faction	The 50% threshold ensures significant majority support
3	Formation of the Inquiry Committee	The DPR forms an inquiry committee composed of representatives from each faction, selected proportionally; the committee elects a chairperson and a secretary	Proportional representation of all factions
4	Conduct of the Investigation	The inquiry committee has the authority to: summon officials or citizens to testify; request government documents; consult experts; and conduct on-site inspections	Significant investigative powers, similar to those of a criminal investigation
5	Report Preparation	The inquiry committee prepares a report on the findings of the investigation, along with conclusions and recommendations, to be presented to a plenary session of the House of Representatives	A formal document that serves as the basis for the DPR's follow-up actions
6	Plenary Session to Discuss the Report	The DPR discusses the inquiry committee's report during a plenary session; the DPR may make decisions based on the report	The final stage of the inquiry process before follow-up actions
7	Follow-up	The DPR may: submit recommendations to the President; proceed to the right to express an opinion; or halt the process if no evidence is found	The DPR's flexibility in determining the final response

C. Powers of the Inquiry Committee

The authority of the inquiry committee is at the heart of the power of the right of inquiry. Under the MD3 Law, the inquiry committee has significant powers:

- Summon state officials, government officials, legal entities, or citizens to provide testimony before the committee.
- Request documents, data, and information related to the subject of the investigation from government agencies.
- To engage experts as needed for technical analysis of the documents obtained.
- To conduct on-site inspections, if necessary, to verify relevant facts.
- If necessary, coordinate with law enforcement agencies regarding aspects related to alleged legal violations.

The right of inquiry is a political-constitutional instrument, not a law enforcement tool. An inquiry committee has no authority to arrest, detain, or prosecute anyone. The results of an inquiry take the form of recommendations to the House of Representatives and the government—not legal verdicts. Attempts to use the right of inquiry for purposes that go beyond the function of legislative oversight—as in the case of the 2017 KPK inquiry—raise serious constitutional questions.

D. Historical Precedents: The Bank Century Inquiry and the KPK Inquiry

The two most significant historical instances of the DPR's use of its inquiry powers since the reform era are the Bank Century inquiry (2009–2010) and the KPK inquiry (2017):

Event	Description	Critical Notes
Bank Century Inquiry (2009–2010)	The first significant post-Reform era inquiry; investigated the Rp 6.7 T Bank Century bailout; concluded with recommendations to the government	Did not lead to impeachment; the government claimed the bailout was lawful; party conflicts overshadowed the substance
KPK Inquiry (2017)	The House of Representatives exercised its inquiry right against the KPK regarding alleged	Constitutionality was questioned: the KPK is not

	procedural violations by the KPK during investigations; highly controversial	part of the government, so an inquiry should target the government's implementation of laws; the Constitutional Court ruled that the inquiry into the KPK was lawful
Interpellations on various policies	The DPR has repeatedly filed interpellations regarding government policies on fuel prices, economic policies, and foreign policy	The level of effectiveness varies; these often end with formal statements without any real policy changes
Right to Express an Opinion (in practice)	Throughout the reform era, the right to express an opinion—which holds significant constitutional weight (regarding the President/Vice President)—has never been exercised to the point of filing a case with the Constitutional Court	This reflects coalition dynamics: a DPR dominated by the ruling coalition has no incentive to exercise this right against a President from the same coalition

These two cases highlight two distinct issues that can hinder the effectiveness of the right to conduct an inquiry: first, the issue of coalition dynamics, which causes the inquiry to lose its “bite” even when the process proceeds formally (the Bank Century case); and second, the issue of jurisdiction, which raises constitutional questions regarding the use of the right to conduct an inquiry (the KPK case).

V. THE RIGHT OF INTERPELLATION: A FORMAL DIALOGUE FORUM BETWEEN THE DPR AND THE EXECUTIVE

A. The Nature of the Right of Interpellation

The right of interpellation is an instrument that differs in nature from the right of inquiry. While an inquiry is investigative—actively seeking and verifying facts—interpellation is deliberative: the DPR requests information from the government, listens to its responses, and then discusses them. Interpellation is an official forum for dialogue between the DPR and the executive branch, in which the DPR acts as the party demanding accountability and the government acts as the party explaining its policies. A substantive requirement for exercising the right of interpellation is that the policy in question must be “important, strategic, and have a broad impact on the life of society, the nation, and the state.” This requirement is intended to ensure that interpellation is used for issues that are truly significant at the national level, rather than for routine or non-controversial matters.

B. Stages of Exercising the Right of Interpellation

The mechanism for exercising the right of interpellation is simpler than that for the right of inquiry, but it is still well-structured:

No	Stage	Substance	Notes
1	Submission of a Motion	At least 25 members of the House of Representatives from more than one faction submit a written interpellation proposal to the leadership of the House of Representatives, accompanied by the policy material regarding which clarification is sought	The policy must be important, strategic, and have a broad impact
2	Discussion in a Plenary Session	The plenary session decides whether to approve or reject the motion for interpellation; the decision is based on a majority vote	Easier than a parliamentary inquiry; no specific 50% threshold required
3	Submission to the President	The leadership of the House of Representatives submits the interpellation decision to the	The President's obligation to

		President; the President is required to provide a statement	provide an explanation is constitutional
4	The President's Explanation	The President or a designated official provides a statement during a plenary session of the DPR; the DPR may ask further questions	Official forum for executive-legislative dialogue
5	Discussion and Conclusions	The DPR discusses the statement provided and may draw conclusions; if dissatisfied, the DPR may exercise its right to express an opinion	An interpellation may serve as a gateway to stronger rights

C. Characteristics and Limitations of the Right of Interpellation

Interpellation has several characteristics that distinguish it from an inquiry and determine its effectiveness and limitations:

- Informative-deliberative nature: Interpellation creates a forum for discussion, not an investigative process. The quality of an interpellation depends heavily on the quality of the questions posed by the House of Representatives and the quality of the answers provided by the government.
- The President's Obligation to Respond: Unlike ordinary questions, an interpellation creates a constitutional obligation for the President to provide a statement. Refusal or evasion of this obligation will have serious political implications.
- Potential for escalation: An interpellation can serve as a gateway to stronger legislative powers. If the DPR is dissatisfied with the explanation provided, it may exercise its right to express an opinion as a follow-up.
- Limitations: An interpellation does not result in an independent investigation. The government controls the information provided, so the DPR relies on the government's honesty in providing accurate and complete information.

VI. THE RIGHT TO EXPRESS AN OPINION: FROM OPINION TO IMPEACHMENT

A. The Nature and Spectrum of the Right to Express an Opinion

The right to express an opinion has the widest spectrum: ranging from ordinary statements of opinion regarding a policy to statements that have the potential to trigger the process of impeaching the President. This diversity reflects the breadth of the DPR's representative functions, ranging from voicing the people's interests regarding public policy to serving as a constitutional gatekeeper in the process of holding the President accountable.

Type/Category	Description	Contextual Examples	Character
Government Policy	A statement by the House of Representatives regarding a government policy deemed detrimental to national interests or contrary to the public interest	Related to executive policies in general	Most frequently used; political in nature
Extraordinary Events	A statement by the House of Representatives regarding events deemed extraordinary and requiring a firm response from the state	National disasters, crises, major diplomatic incidents	May imply support or a demand for action
Alleged Legal Violations by the President/Vice President	Statement by the House of Representatives regarding alleged violations of the law, corruption, bribery, treason, or serious criminal offenses by the President or Vice President	This is the constitutional path toward impeachment	The strongest and rarest; carries the most significant constitutional consequences

B. The Right to Express an Opinion and Impeachment

The most significant aspect of the right to express an opinion—and what fundamentally distinguishes it from the right of interpellation—is its direct connection to the impeachment process of the President and/or Vice President. When the DPR expresses the opinion that the President or Vice President is suspected of having committed a legal violation as referred to in Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution, a very serious constitutional process is triggered. Indonesia's impeachment process, which involves the DPR, the Constitutional Court (MK), and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in sequence, is one of the most complex and multi-layered impeachment mechanisms in the world:

No	Stage	Substance	Actors	Notes
1	Interpellation/Inquiry by the House of Representatives	The DPR exercises its right to interpellation or inquiry against the President or Vice President regarding alleged violations	DPR	Fact-finding process; initial basis
2	The DPR's Right to Express an Opinion	The DPR expresses the opinion that the President or Vice President has violated the law; approved by a plenary session	House of Representatives (two-thirds of members present, in a session attended by two-thirds of members)	Constitutional pathway to the Constitutional Court
3	Request to the Constitutional Court	The DPR submits a request to the Constitutional Court to examine, adjudicate, and rule on the alleged violation by the President or Vice President	House of Representatives → Constitutional Court	The Constitutional Court has 90 days to render a decision
4	Constitutional Court Ruling	The Constitutional Court declares the alleged violations by the President or Vice President proven or not proven	Constitutional Court	If not proven, the process ends here
5	MPR Plenary Session	If the Constitutional Court rules that the allegations are proven, the House of Representatives submits a request to the People's Consultative Assembly; the People's Consultative Assembly convenes within 30 days	DPR → MPR	The MPR may decide whether or not to remove him from office
6	MPR Decision	The MPR decides whether to remove the President or Vice President from office or to reject the motion; at least three-quarters of the members must be present; the decision requires at least two-thirds of the votes of those present	MPR	Removal from office is the constitutional culmination of the impeachment process

Unlike in a parliamentary system, where a vote of no confidence can bring down a government for purely political reasons, the impeachment of the President in Indonesia's presidential system can only be carried out on the basis of specific legal violations (Article 7A of the 1945 Constitution): treason, corruption, bribery, other serious criminal offenses, or disgraceful conduct. Political dislike or mere disagreement with policies is not sufficient grounds to impeach the President in a presidential system.

VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH PARLIAMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

A. Oversight Mechanisms in Various Parliaments

To understand the position of the three rights of the DPR from a comparative perspective, it is important to examine how parliaments in other countries have similar instruments:

Country	Equivalent to an Inquiry	Investigation Mechanism	Equivalent to Interpellation	Impeachment
United States (Congress)	Investigation (Committee Hearing)	Subpoena for witness testimony and documents; formal investigation by a committee	Resolution of Inquiry, Resolution of No Confidence (rare)	Impeachment by the House of Representatives; trial by the Senate
United Kingdom (Parliament)	Select Committee Inquiry	Summoning of officials; open public hearings	A Vote of No Confidence can bring down the government	No formal impeachment; the Prime Minister must have the confidence of Parliament
Germany (Bundestag)	Untersuchungsausschuss (Investigative Committee)	Strong investigative powers; can summon witnesses	Anfrage (interpellation); Resolutions	A constructive vote of no confidence must be accompanied by the election of a new Chancellor
Indonesia (DPR)	Inquiry Rights	At least 50% of members; inquiry committee with investigative powers	Right to Interpellation; Right to Express an Opinion	Right to Express an Opinion → Constitutional Court → People's Consultative Assembly (impeachment)

B. Lessons from the Comparison

Some important lessons from the comparison above:

1. Parliamentary vs. presidential systems: Parliaments in parliamentary systems (such as the UK) have a far more powerful instrument—the vote of no confidence—which can directly bring down a government. In presidential systems (such as Indonesia and the U.S.), oversight instruments are more limited, and impeachment procedures are longer and more complex.
2. The investigative power of the U.S. Congress: U.S. congressional investigative committees, which possess very strong subpoena authority, illustrate just how effectively similar instruments—such as inquiries—can function when politicians have the will and capacity to use them seriously.
3. The German Model: Germany's constructive vote of no confidence—which requires that parliament cannot oust the government unless it simultaneously elects a successor—is an innovative design that prevents political instability without sacrificing accountability.
4. Effective use depends on political will: In all systems, the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight instruments depends on the parliament's political will to use them meaningfully. Even the most sophisticated instruments will not be effective if the parliamentary majority lacks the incentive to truly oversee the government.

VIII. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING

A. Key Challenge: Coalition Dominance

The most fundamental challenge threatening the effectiveness of the DPR's three constitutional rights is the dominance of the governing coalition in parliament. When most or even nearly all factions in the DPR are part of the coalition supporting the President, the incentive to exercise the right to conduct inquiries, issue interpellations, or express critical opinions toward the government becomes

very weak. This paradox is a structural feature of a presidential system with a multiparty system like Indonesia's: to ensure governmental stability, the President must build a broad coalition in the DPR. However, a coalition that is too broad actually weakens the DPR's oversight function because members of coalition parties have an interest in protecting the government rather than critically overseeing it. The 2019–2024 DPR, which has virtually no significant opposition, is an extreme example of this condition. Constitutional rights that are normatively very strong have been "dormant" because no political force has sufficient incentive to exercise them.

B. Second Challenge: Ambiguity Regarding the Scope of the Inquiry

The controversy surrounding the KPK inquiry (2017) revealed ambiguity regarding the scope of the inquiry's subject matter. The MD3 Law defines an inquiry as an investigation into the implementation of laws or government policies. The question is: can the KPK—an independent institution that is not part of the executive branch in the narrow sense—be the subject of an inquiry? The Constitutional Court ruled that the inquiry into the KPK was valid because the KPK is an institution established by the government (in the sense of the state) and performs executive functions (law enforcement). However, this ruling does not resolve a more fundamental question: does the use of the right to conduct an inquiry against an independent institution such as the KPK carry the risk of intimidation that could undermine its independence?

C. Recommendations

To strengthen the effectiveness of the DPR's three constitutional rights, this article formulates several recommendations:

1. Strengthening the DPR's independent budgeting mechanism: One way to reduce the DPR's functional dependence on the executive branch is to ensure that the DPR's budget is not contingent on the government's goodwill for its disbursement.
2. Strengthening the rights of minority factions in the exercise of oversight powers: A revision of the MD3 Law could consider mechanisms that allow opposition factions (even if they are in the minority) to more easily utilize certain oversight instruments.
3. Clarifying the scope of inquiries in the revision of the MD3 Law: Clearer provisions are needed regarding the categories of institutions and policies that can be subject to inquiries, to prevent the use of inquiries as a tool for intimidating independent institutions.
4. Strengthening a committee system that is more independent of the coalition: A design for the DPR's committee system that ensures the chairperson of a committee is not always held by a faction of the governing coalition can promote more effective oversight functions.
5. Public constitutional education on the DPR's rights: Increasing public understanding of these three rights will create more effective social pressure on the DPR to exercise them responsibly.

IX. CONCLUSION

Based on the study conducted, this article draws the following conclusions:

1. The right to conduct an inquiry, the right to interpellation, and the right to express an opinion are the three constitutional rights of the DPR explicitly guaranteed by Article 20A(2) of the 1945 Constitution and operationalized through Law No. 17 of 2014 on the DPR, the Government, and the Regional Representatives Council (MD3 Law). These three rights form a spectrum of oversight instruments ranging from those of an informative-deliberative nature (interpellation), to investigative-formal (inquiry), to constitutional-political (expression of opinion).
2. The right to conduct an inquiry is the strongest in terms of investigative power, with the authority to summon officials, request documents, and conduct examinations. Its strict approval requirements (at least 50% of members plus more than one faction) reflect just how serious the implications of its use are. Historical practice (the Bank Century case, the KPK) shows that even when formal processes are underway, coalition dynamics can determine whether an inquiry actually leads to accountability.
3. The right of interpellation is deliberative in nature and creates a constitutional obligation for the President to provide information to the DPR. It can serve as a gateway to the exercise of stronger rights. However, its effectiveness depends on the government's openness in providing accurate and complete information.

4. The right to express opinions has the broadest spectrum—ranging from ordinary opinions on policy to statements that can trigger an impeachment process. Indonesia's impeachment mechanism, which involves the DPR, the Constitutional Court (MK), and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) in sequence, is one of the most multi-layered in the world, designed to prevent impeachments motivated solely by political considerations.
5. The greatest challenge to the effectiveness of these three rights is the dominance of the governing coalition in the DPR, which reduces members' incentives to use oversight instruments critically. Strengthening mechanisms that promote committee independence, the rights of minority factions, and transparency in the exercise of these rights is the most urgent reform agenda.

Ultimately, the House of Representatives' three constitutional rights—inquiries, interpellations, and expressing opinions—are a legacy of the awareness that power without oversight is power that has the potential to become arbitrary. They are not merely rights of the DPR as an institution, but mechanisms designed to ensure that the people, through their representatives, always have a constitutional channel to question, investigate, and ultimately, if necessary, halt power that has strayed from its proper course. Ensuring that these three rights truly function—rather than merely existing in theory—is a constitutional responsibility that no member of the DPR can evade.

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